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Abstract: This study reports the results of fifteen experimental asset markets designed to investigate the effects of 
forecasts on market prices, traders’ abilities to assess asset value, and the link between the two. Across the fifteen 
markets, the authors investigate alternative forecast-generating processes. In some markets the process produces an 
unbiased estimate of asset value and in others a biased estimate. The processes generating the biased forecasts, 
though, are less variable than the process generating the unbiased forecast. The authors find that, in general, period-
end asset price reflects private forecasts, regardless of the forecast-generating process. Subsequently, they 
investigate whether traders’ abilities to use forecasts differ across the forecast-generating processes. The authors find 
that most are able to properly use unbiased forecasts. They refer to them as smart traders. By comparison, a 
significant proportion is unable to properly use biased forecasts (typically traders’ adjustments for bias are 
insufficient). Linking market outcomes and traders’ abilities, the authors find that asset price appears to properly 
reflect unbiased forecasts as long as the market includes at least two smart informed traders who have sufficient 
ability to influence market outcomes. To obtain a comparable result in markets with the biased forecast, at least three 
smart informed traders with sufficient ability to influence market outcomes are necessary.  
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1. Introduction 
This study reports the results of 15 experimental asset markets designed to 
investigate the effects of forecasts on market prices, traders’ abilities to assess asset 
value, and the link between the two.  Each market consists of a series of trading periods 
in which traders can purchase a forecast of period-end asset value.  Across the 15 
markets, we investigate alternative forecast-generating processes: one that produces an 
unbiased estimate of asset value, one that produces an optimistic biased estimate, and one 
that produces a pessimistic biased estimate.  The processes generating the biased 
forecasts, though, are less variable than the process generating the unbiased forecast.  
After the trading periods are completed, each market includes a series of prediction 
periods in which forecasts are publicly announced and participants predict asset value. 
We investigate whether the alternative forecast-generating processes affect the 
convergence of asset price over time: specifically, whether asset prices are similar, 
regardless of forecast bias and variability.  Next, we examine individual traders’ abilities 
to properly use the forecasts.  By examining market outcomes and individual abilities, we 
link the two.  An important contribution of this study is that we investigate the number of 
smart, informed traders (i.e., those able to properly use forecasts) necessary to produce an 
outcome that approaches a rational price. 
An understanding of the link between market outcomes and traders’ abilities is 
critical to assess theoretical models of market behavior.  Traditional models contend that 
asset prices are not affected by traders’ abilities and information is fully reflected in   2 
market outcomes in accordance with the laws of statistics and probability.  Recent 
models, on the other hand, suggest that market prices may deviate from rational 
outcomes, primarily because market participants have limited abilities and are susceptible 
to judgment biases and heuristics (Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998).  Bossaerts (2002) underscores the importance of 
properly modeling traders’ beliefs in order to appropriately characterize market 
outcomes. 
Experimental evidence on market pricing is mixed.  Ganguly, Kagel, & Moser 
(1994; 2000) and Tuttle, Coller, & Burton (1997) report that individual biases persist in 
market pricing, whereas Knez, Smith, & Williams (1985), Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, & 
Wright (1992), and Forsythe, Reitz, & Ross (1999) find otherwise.  More recently, 
Ackert & Church (2001) and Kluger & Wyatt (2002) suggest that the mix of traders who 
are susceptible to judgment biases affects whether rational market outcomes are achieved.  
They encourage research in this area to provide insight into market behavior.  Our study 
directly examines the association between market participants’ abilities to properly use 
private forecasts and resulting market prices.  A model of how individuals form beliefs 
about market valuations is a significant missing chapter in current asset pricing theory 
(Hirshleifer, 2001).  Our work provides direction for future theoretical modeling of the 
link between individual behavior and market outcomes. 
A notable feature of our design is that we include optimistic as well as pessimistic 
forecasts.  Prior studies have focused on optimistic forecasts (e.g., Ackert, Church, & 
Shehata, 1996; 1997a; Ackert, Church, & Zhang, 2002).  Yet research documents that 
individual analysts are persistently optimistic or pessimistic (Butler & Lang, 1991).  
Notably, adjustments for bias may differ depending on the direction of the bias.  Prior   3 
research suggests that sophisticated users may overreact to positive information and 
underreact to negative information (Amir & Ganzach, 1998; Easterwood & Nutt, 1999).  
In our setting, we investigate whether traders’ adjustments for optimistic forecasts are 
less pronounced than their adjustments for pessimistic forecasts.  We then examine 
whether market outcomes differ depending on the direction of the bias.  An 
understanding of market participants’ abilities to adjust for optimistic and pessimistic 
bias, which determines their revised beliefs, is critical to evaluate market outcomes 
(Bossaerts, 2002). 
Lastly, we investigate traders’ preference for information produced by the 
alternative forecast-generating processes.  Recall that in our experimental markets 
unbiased forecasts contain more variability than biased (optimistic or pessimistic) 
forecasts.  If traders are able to adjust for bias, then biased forecasts are preferable 
because the information provides a superior estimate of asset value.  But adjustment for 
bias is not an easy task.  Biased forecasts include systematic and random error 
components and disentangling the two can be quite daunting (Klayman, 1988).  We 
examine the frequency with which traders acquire unbiased versus biased forecasts when 
both are available.  An understanding of traders’ forecast acquisition decisions is 
necessary to provide insight into the financial analyst’s role as a vital source of 
information in the marketplace.  The examination is particularly relevant because analysts 
have incentives to release biased forecasts and such forecasts can be optimal (Gu and 
Wu, 2000; Lim, 2001). 
Our findings indicate that closing price typically approaches a rational price.  
Further inspection of the data indicates heterogeneity in traders’ abilities to properly use 
forecasts.  We refer to traders who make unbiased predictions of asset value as smart   4 
traders.  The vast majority of traders who make predictions using the unbiased forecast 
are smart traders.  By comparison, the proportion of smart traders is much less in markets 
with biased forecasts: 56 percent with an optimistic bias and 70 percent with a pessimistic 
bias.  Further inspection of the data indicates that in markets with the unbiased forecast, 
the closing price approaches a rational outcome as long as the market includes two smart 
informed traders who have sufficient ability to influence market outcomes.  In markets 
with the biased forecast, three smart informed traders, with sufficient ability to influence 
market outcomes, are necessary to produce a comparable result.  Lastly, our data indicate 
that traders do not have a preference for the biased forecast over the unbiased forecast, 
even though the former contains less variability.  This result appears to arise because 
many traders (30-45 percent) have difficulty adjusting for systematic bias. 
We describe the experimental asset markets in section 2 and then develop 
experimental predictions in section 3.  Subsequently, we present the experimental results.  
We offer concluding remarks and discuss the findings in the final section. 
 
2. Experimental asset markets 
Overview and design 
We conduct 15 experimental asset markets, each of which consists of a series of 
trading periods.  Each period participants trade an asset having a one-period life.  Before 
trading begins, participants may acquire a forecast of asset value.  At period end, the asset 
pays a liquidating dividend, which determines asset value.  In addition, each market 
includes a series of prediction periods, which take place after the trading periods are 
completed.  In prediction periods, forecasts are publicly announced and participants 
individually predict asset value.     5 
Across the 15 markets, we vary the forecast-generating process and the 
availability of forecasts.  One forecast is available in the first nine markets.  In markets 1-
3, the forecast-generating process produces an unbiased estimate of asset value.  The 
forecast is computed as the period-end dividend plus a mean zero, random error term, 
determined by drawing from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of $100 
(denoted NOBIAS).  In markets 4-6, the forecast-generating process produces an 
optimistic biased estimate of asset value.  The optimistic forecast is computed as the 
period-end dividend plus a constant (bias) of $200 plus a mean zero, random error term, 
determined by drawing from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of $50 
(denoted UPBIAS).  In markets 7-9, the forecast-generating process produces a 
pessimistic biased forecast.  The forecast is determined similar to the optimistic forecast, 
except that the constant is !$200 (denoted DOWNBIAS). 
In the final six markets, two forecasts are available and traders may acquire one, 
both, or neither.  In markets 10-12, the NOBIAS and UPBIAS forecasts are available 
(denoted NOUP markets).  In markets 13-15, the NOBIAS and DOWNBIAS forecasts 
are available (denoted NODOWN markets).  The forecasts are identical to those used in 
markets 1-9.  The experimental design is summarized in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Experimental procedures 
At the beginning of each market, participants receive a set of instructions and 
follow along as an experimenter reads aloud.
1  Participants are third- and fourth-year 
undergraduate and fifth-year post baccalaureate students in business and economics at a 
medium-sized university.  All participants are inexperienced in that none took part in   6 
more than one market.  Eleven markets include eight participants and four include seven 
participants.  The average compensation across the 116 participants was $26.36, with a 
range of $16.41 - $33.67.   
Each market consists of 12 trading periods, and participants are not informed 
beforehand of the number of periods.  Participants are instructed that the period-end 
dividend is determined by drawing from a normal distribution with a mean of $1,200 and 
a standard deviation of $400.
2  The instructions include a diagram of the density function 
and state that “the dividend is between $800 and $1,600 with a probability of 0.6826, 
between $600 and $1,800 with a probability of 0.8664, and between $400 and $2,000 
with a probability of 0.9544.”  Further, the instructions state that “(p)ractically speaking, 
the dividend is always nonnegative.”  Prior to conducting the markets, the dividend draws 
are determined for periods 1-12 and the pre-selected values are used in all markets.
3 
Each trading period, participants are endowed with two certificates and $50,000.   
Participants are informed that they may be required to pay a tax on their dividend 
earnings: personal tax rates are either zero or 40 percent.  The instructions indicate that 
the tax rates differ across traders and periods.  At the beginning of each trading period, 
half of the participants are assigned each tax rate, and across the 12 periods, each 
participant is assigned each rate the same number of times.
4  The different tax rates 
introduce different preferences for dividend earnings and create incentives to trade.  
Certificates are worth more to participants with a zero tax rate on dividend earnings than 
those with a 40 percent tax rate.  Hence, participants with a zero tax rate have incentives 
to buy certificates, whereas those with a 40 percent tax rate have incentives to sell.  
Importantly, capital gains are not taxed.   7 
Before trading, participants are allowed to purchase a forecast of the period-end 
dividend at a fixed price of $150 per forecast.  To allow them to assess the usefulness of 
the forecast, participants are provided with a forecast history collected over 12 practice 
periods.  The history details the forecast error per period (forecast minus the period-end 
dividend) and the mean and standard deviation of the forecast error.  We include the 
forecast history because historical data are typically available in naturally occurring 
markets.  As mentioned earlier, two forecasts are available in markets 10-15, referred to 
as forecast A and forecast B.  For each forecast, a history is provided.  Across all 
markets, participants are informed that the process generating each forecast is unique and 
constant across periods. 
At the beginning of each trading period, participants make a forecast acquisition 
decision.  Those acquiring the forecast are provided with an updated forecast history (i.e., 
the forecast and asset value realizations for all prior periods) and the current period’s 
forecast.  The specific identity and total number of traders acquiring the forecast per 
period is not revealed.  In markets 1-9, participants may spend $150 to acquire a forecast.  
In markets 10-15, they may spend $150 to acquire one forecast and $300 to acquire both.  
As discussed earlier, forecasts are unbiased in some markets, optimistic biased in other 
markets, and pessimistic biased in still other markets.
5  
In markets 10-15, we allowed participants to acquire both forecasts because the 
two forecasts represent independent estimates of asset value.  As discussed in the next 
section, we posit that traders should acquire the biased forecast because it provides a 
superior estimate of asset value.  But the biased forecast only provides a more precise 
estimate if traders are able to sufficiently adjust for bias.  If traders have difficulty 
adjusting for bias (e.g., some amount of bias is presumed to represent noise), they may   8 
believe that both forecasts are useful.  Accordingly, we provide them with the 
opportunity to acquire the unbiased, biased, or both forecasts. 
All markets are organized as double oral auctions.  The double auction institution 
has been examined extensively in the literature and has robust equilibrating properties 
when small numbers of traders possess private information (Smith, 1994).  In our 
markets, traders are free to make verbal offers to buy or sell one certificate at a 
designated price at any time, and all offers are publicly announced and recorded.  
Outstanding offers stand until accepted or replaced by a better bid or ask price.  Traders 
are allowed to short sell up to two certificates per period, but they are required to pay the 
dividend on all certificates sold short.  The trading certificates are not carried across 
periods.  
At the end of each trading period, the dividend is publicly announced and the 
same dividend is received for all certificates held by a participant.  Period-end cash 
balances are computed as follows.  The number of certificates on hand is multiplied by 
the dividend per certificate to determine dividend earnings.  This amount is converted to 
an after-tax figure by multiplying by one minus the tax rate.  Participants add the after-tax 
dividend earnings to their cash balance, subtract the cost of acquiring forecasted 
information, and then subtract the initial endowment of $50,000.  The net amount 
represents participants’ profits for the period.  The instructions indicate that participants 
will be paid 0.1 percent of their total after-tax profit in cash.   
After the 12 trading periods are completed, a second set of instructions is 
distributed.  This phase is intended to gather information on participants’ predictive 
abilities.  We conduct additional, non-market periods in which a forecast is publicly 
announced and participants are given 30 seconds to predict the period-end dividend.  The   9 
prior history, including the updated mean and standard deviation of the forecast error, is 
publicly displayed.  Participants are instructed that the forecast is determined based on 
the same process used throughout the experiment.  Participants receive $0.25 for each 
prediction that is within "$100 of the period-end dividend.
6  For markets 1-9, participants 
make predictions over six additional periods.  For markets 10-15, participants make 
predictions over 12 additional periods.  Over six periods the unbiased forecast (referred to 
as forecast A) is provided, and over six additional periods the biased forecast is provided 
(referred to as forecast B). 
At the conclusion of each market session, participants compute the amount of 
cash to be received and complete a post-experiment questionnaire.  The questionnaire is 
designed to collect general information about the participants and how they view the 
experiment. 
 
3. Experimental predictions 
Market outcomes 
  We adopt a noisy rational expectations framework to develop predictions of 
market outcomes.  According to the NRE framework, private information is 
disseminated, though not immediately, and fully reflected in period-end prices (e.g., 
Hellwig, 1982; Grundy & McNichols, 1989).  Asset prices adjust away from the 
uninformed or prior price, which reflects only publicly available information, toward the 
informed price, which reflects public as well as private information (e.g., Sunder, 1992). 
  Foster & Viswanathan’s (1996) theoretical analysis is applicable to our 
experimental setting.  They examine the informativeness of price when a subset of traders 
is endowed with an unbiased estimate of asset value.  Their results suggest that when a   10 
sufficient number of informed traders possess identical information, asset price converges 
to the informed price after only a few trades.
7  We investigate whether this result occurs 
in markets with unbiased forecasts (i.e., the NOBIAS markets).  Using a Bayesian 





FA is the standard deviation of the asset value, Fu is the unbiased forecast, FFu is the 
standard deviation of the unbiased forecast, and µA is the mean asset value.  
  We also investigate whether the informed price is achieved in markets with biased 
forecasts (UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS).  Prior experimental research indicates that 
individuals can adjust for optimistic bias forecasts, but that differences in abilities are 
apparent (Ackert et al., 1997a).  Archival findings suggest that, in general, sophisticated 
users overreact to positive/optimistic information and underreact to negative/pessimistic 
information (Amir & Ganzach, 1998; Easterwood & Nutt, 1999).  We investigate 
whether asset price approaches an informed price that adjusts for forecast bias, regardless 
of individuals’ abilities (this issue is discussed further in the next subsection).  The 






adj is the biased 
forecast adjusted for the systematic bias, FFb is the standard deviation of the biased 
forecast, and the other terms are as defined previously.  
The unbiased forecast and informed price for trading periods 1-12 are shown in 
Table 2.  We test whether the closing price per period differs between markets with 
unbiased or biased forecasts (NOBIAS, UPBIAS, and DOWNBIAS) and, for each market 
set, whether it differs from the informed price.  We also explore the speed of the price 
adjustment process.  As mentioned earlier, Foster & Viswanathan’s (1996) analysis 
suggests that when the informed traders possess identical information, the informed price 
is achieved quickly in markets with unbiased forecasts.  We investigate the speed of the   11 
price adjustment process and assess whether differences arise between market sets 
(NOBIAS, UPBIAS, and DOWNBIAS). 
[insert Table 2 here] 
Additionally, we investigate whether the informed price is achieved in markets 
with unbiased and biased forecasts (NOUP and NODOWN).  Foster & Viswanathan 
(1996) analyze a second case in which informed traders possess diverse, imperfectly 
correlated estimates of asset value.  They demonstrate that, as long as a sufficient number 
of traders possess private information, asset price converges to the informed price.  Price 
convergence, however, is slower than in markets with identical private information.  If 














2), where the terms 
are as defined previously.
8  We test whether the closing price per period differs between 
the NOUP and NODOWN markets and, for each market set, whether it differs from the 
informed price.  We also explore whether the price formation process is slower in 
markets with two forecasts as compared to one as suggested by Foster & Viswanathan 
(1996). 
 
Smart informed traders and market outcomes 
Market outcomes are likely conditioned on informed traders’ abilities to use 
forecasts.  Experimental research suggests that such abilities differ across traders (e.g., 
Peterson, 1993; Ackert & Church, 2001, Kluger & Wyatt, 2002).  Theoretical models 
have long recognized the importance of heterogeneity among agents in explaining 
economic behavior (e.g., Figlewski, 1978; Haltiwanger & Waldman, 1985; Chiarella &   12 
He, 2002).  We examine the association between the mix of market participants and 
market outcomes.   
Market outcomes can be rational even though traders, on average, are not.
9  
Becker (1962) argues that it is the behavior of the marginal investor, rather than the 
average investor, that determines market prices.  Likewise, Camerer (1987; 1992) 
suggests that asset prices converge to a rational outcome as long as a subset of rational 
traders drives market prices.  We are interested in the number of smart traders (i.e., those 
who can properly use forecasts) necessary to produce a rational outcome. 
Theoretical results suggest that asset price more readily converges to a rational 
equilibrium as the number of smart informed traders increases (Rustichini, Satterthwaite, 
& Williams, 1994).  The competition to buy and sell certificates intensifies as this subset 
of traders increases, thereby moving price toward the informed price.  The issue remains, 
however, as to how many smart informed traders are sufficient to produce a rational 
outcome.  Foster & Viswanathan (1996) perform a numerical analysis and show that, in 
their setting, three smart informed traders are sufficient.  Based on the theory of perfect 
competition, however, two smart informed traders are enough to produce an asset price 
that approaches the informed price.  We empirically examine the association between 
number of smart informed traders and the closing price period and determine whether the 
results are comparable across market sets.  As Kluger & Wyatt (2002) argue, an 
understanding of this issue is critical to link individual and market outcomes. 
In addition to identifying the number of smart informed traders, we investigate 
other traders’ abilities.  We examine whether other traders’ predictions of asset value fail 
to sufficiently adjust for forecast bias: i.e., predictions exceed asset value with UPBIAS 
forecasts and fall below it with DOWNBIAS forecasts.  Simply put, we investigate   13 
whether other traders have systematic biases in their predictions of asset value.  We 
assess whether the magnitude of adjustment for forecast bias differs between those who 
receive UPBIAS versus DOWNBIAS forecasts.  The archival findings of Ganzach & 
Amir (1998) and Easterwood & Nutt (1999) suggest that the adjustment for optimistic 
bias may be less than that for pessimistic bias.  
 
Forecast acquisition decisions 
In a noisy rational expectations framework, traders may prosper by acquiring 
forecasts of asset value because private information is not reflected immediately in asset 
prices.  Jackson (1991) demonstrates that the acquisition of costly information arises in 
equilibria and that, over time, the information is fully revealed in asset prices.  
Experimental evidence indicates that private imperfect information has value (Copeland 
& Friedman, 1991; Ackert, Church, & Shehata, 1997b).  In markets with one forecast, a 
subset of traders is likely to acquire the forecast because it provides them with a useful 
estimate of asset value (Jackson, 1991).  This result is expected, regardless of the 
forecast-generating process. 
In markets with two forecasts, we investigate whether traders have a preference 
for information produced by a particular process.  In all cases, the forecast-generating 
process includes a random error term; however, for the process generating the unbiased 
forecast, the standard deviation of the error term is twice as large as that for the processes 
generating the biased forecasts.
10  We know that, other things being equal, traders prefer 
unbiased to biased forecasts because the former do not have to be adjusted or processed 
further (Ackert et al., 1996).  At the same time, we know that traders prefer less 
variability in a forecast because a less variable forecast reflects less uncertainty.    14 
Moreover, traders have difficulty dealing with variability in general, which may have a 
deleterious effect on their abilities to properly use forecasts (Lopes & Oden, 1987). 
For the NOUP and NODOWN markets, we test whether the frequency of forecast 
acquisitions differs between the process generating the unbiased, more variable forecast 
and that generating the biased, less variable forecast.  If traders are able to adjust for 
systematic bias, they may acquire the biased forecast more frequently because it allows 
them to make a more precise estimate of asset value.  Ackert et al. (1997a) provide 
evidence that participants can adjust for small amounts of optimistic forecast bias in an 
individual setting.  Prior studies, however, have not examined participants’ abilities to 
adjust for pessimistic forecast bias.  Further, evidence suggests that adjustments for bias 
need not be symmetric (e.g., Amir and Ganzach, 1998).  We investigate whether traders’ 
abilities to adjust for systematic bias affect the frequency with which they acquire the 




  We investigate price behavior over the course of the experiment.  We examine 
whether the closing price per period approaches the informed price and, further, test for 
differences between the market sets.  We also investigate the price formation process.  
We assess whether the process differs between markets with one forecast as compared to 
markets with two.   
  Closing price. Figures 1-5 plot the time series of the closing and informed prices 
per period for each set of markets.  Each figure includes prices for the three sessions 
conducted under the same experimental condition.  In the NOBIAS markets, the closing   15 
price per period very closely tracks the informed price, particularly over the later periods.  
In the other markets, deviations from the informed price are more apparent, though the 
closing price per period generally is not far from the informed price.  
[insert Figures 1-5 here] 
We examine the nearness of closing price per period to the informed price.  For 
each market set, we compute the absolute difference between the closing price and the 
informed price, normalized by the informed price.  We refer to this measure as the 
normalized, absolute price deviation (NAPD).  We perform a repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) to test for differences between the market sets.  The dependent 
measure is the NAPD per period and the independent variables include market set, 
period, and the interaction term.  We find that period is significant at p = 0.002 (F = 
7.10).  The data indicate that the NAPD exhibits a downward trend over the course of the 
experiment.  The other two independent variables (market set and the interaction term) 
are not statistically significant.  The descriptive data suggest that the mean NAPD varies 
somewhat across the market sets (refer to Panel A of Table 3); however, pairwise tests 
indicate that none of the differences are statistically significantly.
11   
[insert Table 3 here] 
Next, we assess whether the closing price per period approaches the informed 
price.  For each market set, we perform a repeated measures ANOVA.  The dependent 
measure is the signed difference between the closing price and the informed price, 
normalized by the informed price (referred to as the NSPD).  The independent variable is 
period.  We test whether the intercept is significantly different from zero.  For each 
market set, we find that the intercept is not statistically significant.
12  Hence, we are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that the NSPD equals zero.  This result suggests that   16 
the closing price per period approaches the informed price across the market sets.  
Overall, market outcomes do not appear to be affected by the forecast-generating process. 
Price formation. In addition to closing price per period, we examine the price 
formation process.  According to the noisy rational expectations framework, price moves 
away from uninformed price toward the informed price as information is disseminated.  
Our earlier discussion suggests that asset price may approach the informed price faster in 
markets with one forecast as compared to two forecasts.  We examine several measures 
of price behavior to gain insight into the speed of price convergence.   
Descriptive data for various measures of price formation are shown in Table 3.  
The data are presented separately for periods 1-6, 7-12, and 1-12.  As discussed 
previously, price behavior (measured by the NAPD) improves over the course of the 
experiment.  Panel A shows the nearness of the closing price per period to the informed 
price, and Panel B shows the nearness of the opening price to the informed price.  The 
normalized, absolute difference is greater using the opening price, which may be 
expected.  That is, price moves toward the informed price within a period.   
Panel C shows the proportion of transactions per period that produce an NAPD 
(based on the transaction price) equal to or less than 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent.  The 
majority of transactions generally fall in the 10 percent or less category and the finding 
holds across market sets.   
Panel D shows the number of transactions per period necessary to reach the 
minimum NAPD for the period (based on the transaction prices within a period).  The 
data suggest that roughly three to five transactions are necessary.  The total number of 
transactions per period is, on average, eight to nine so that the minimum NAPD is 
typically achieved over the first one-third to one-half of the trading period.
 13  Further   17 
inspection of the data indicates that asset price often remains around that which produces 
the minimum NAPD.  In a few instances, it moves away from the minimum, but typically 
it hovers around this price.  The average increase in the NAPD, computed using the 
closing price per period, is roughly 3 percent across the different market sets.
14 
We perform several repeated measures ANOVAs with each measure of price 
formation as the dependent measure and test for differences over periods and across 
markets sets.  Generally, period is statistically significant at p < 0.05.  The deviation 
between the opening price and the informed price shows a downward trend over the 
course of the experiment and the proportion of transactions that produces an NAPD equal 
to or less than 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent shows an upward trend.   
We do not find significant differences between market sets, with one exception.  
We find some evidence that the number of transactions to achieve the minimum NAPD is 
smaller in markets with two versus one forecast.  Pairwise tests indicate that the mean of 
the NODOWN market is less than that of the UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS markets (p < 
0.07).  Likewise, the mean of the NOUP market is less than that of the DOWNBIAS 
market (p = 0.087).
15  This result is contrary to the experimental prediction; however, it 
may arise because several participants in the NOUP and NODOWN markets acquire both 
forecasts.  Our prediction, based on Foster & Viswanathan’s (1996) analysis, presumes 
that some traders acquire the unbiased forecast and others acquire the biased forecast – 
but traders do not acquire both forecasts.  We investigate this possibility later in the 
results section.  
The transaction price data provide evidence that asset price moves toward the 
informed price within a trading period.  However, the price adjustment process is not 
necessarily smooth.  Looking transaction by transaction, we observe that asset price may   18 
move toward the informed price, then away from it, then toward it, and so on.  The data 
indicate that the pattern is sometimes quite erratic.  We also observe that the distance 
between asset price and the informed price is often minimized over the first one-third to 
one-half of a trading period.  Inspection of the data indicates that subsequent transactions 
are typically around the minimum, though in some cases the NAPD increases noticeably.  
Overall, asset price typically shows a trend toward the informed price within a trading 
period, though price adjustment is not necessarily smooth.  Even in well-behaved 
markets, traders can make mistakes or incorrect inferences, particularly in deciphering 
the bid-ask behavior of other market participants.  Bossaerts (2001) contends that even 
good Bayesian learners are subject to error, which affects price formation (see also 
Bossaerts & Hillion, 2001).  Finally, we note that price behavior also appears to improve 
as traders gain experience with the experimental market (i.e., over periods 1-12).   
 
Traders’ predictive abilities and market outcomes 
We investigate whether participants are able to predict asset value.  At the 
conclusion of the 12 trading periods, forecasts are publicly announced and participants 
predict asset value for six or 12 additional periods.  No trading takes place in the 
additional periods.  Thus, the focus is strictly on predictive abilities. 
Traders’ predictive abilities. For markets with one forecast, we classify traders as 
making unbiased or biased predictions of asset value.  To classify them, we examine the 
signs of their prediction errors and determine whether the signs are consistently positive 
or negative.  If at least five of six prediction errors have the same sign, the trader is 
classified as a biased trader: upward if the sign is consistently positive and downward if it 
is consistently negative.
16  Otherwise, the trader is classified as an unbiased trader.  For   19 
markets with two forecasts, we classify each trader twice: once based on their predictions 
using unbiased forecasts and once using biased forecasts. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the classification of traders conditioned on their use of 
unbiased forecasts.  The vast majority of traders (81 percent) make unbiased predictions.  
A binomial test indicates that traders are more likely to be classified as unbiased than 
biased (p < 0.001).  Notably, those making biased predictions typically exhibit a 
downward bias.   
[insert Table 4 here] 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the classification of traders conditioned on their use of 
optimistic bias forecasts.  In this case, a smaller percentage of traders (56 percent) make 
unbiased predictions.  A binomial test indicates that traders are no more likely to be 
classified as unbiased than biased (p = 0.551).  We further note that traders making 
biased predictions tend to be biased upward.  Hence, their adjustments for optimistic bias 
are insufficient. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 4 shows the classification of traders conditioned on their 
use of pessimistic bias forecasts.  A majority of traders (70 percent) are classified as 
unbiased.  A binomial test indicates that traders are more likely to be classified as 
unbiased than biased (p = 0.012).  Those making biased predictions always exhibit a 
downward bias, indicating that their adjustments for pessimistic bias are insufficient. 
Informed smart traders and market outcomes. We refer to traders who make 
unbiased predictions of asset value as smart traders.  For markets with one forecast, we 
examine the link between the number of smart informed traders and the NAPD.  Table 5 
shows the average NAPD, partitioned by the number of smart informed traders, for each   20 
market set.  The table also shows the percentage of transactions per period that involve at 
least one smart informed trader. 
[insert Table 5 here] 
  The data for the NOBIAS markets are shown in Panel A of Table 5.  The NAPD 
decreases as the number of smart traders increases, with the exception of seven smart 
informed traders.  The conspicuously high NAPD is the result of an extreme observation 
that occurs in the first period of market 2: the NAPD is 0.322.  With the exception of this 
extreme observation, the NAPD is quite low as long as the market includes at least three 
smart informed traders.  Interestingly, this result coincides with Foster & Viswanathan’s 
(1996) numerical results.  We also observe that the vast majority of transactions involve 
at least one smart informed trader. 
  The data for the UPBIAS markets, shown in Panel B of Table 5, indicate that the 
NAPD is relatively high with three or fewer smart informed traders.  Notably, with three 
smart informed traders, 100 percent of the transactions involve at least one of them.  Yet 
the activity of these traders is not sufficient to drive the NAPD below 17 percent.  The 
NAPD improves markedly with five smart informed traders and even more with six – 
with at least one of these traders participating in the vast majority of transactions.   
The data for the DOWNBIAS markets, shown in Panel C of Table 5, suggest that 
the NAPD generally decreases as the number of smart informed traders increases.  With 
at least three smart informed traders, the vast majority of transactions involve at least one 
of these traders.  But at least five smart informed traders are necessary to produce an 
NAPD less than 10 percent.  Generally, the results are consistent with those in the 
UPBIAS markets.  The findings for markets with biased forecasts are consistent with   21 
Rustichini et al. (1994): asset price behavior improves as the number of smart informed 
traders increases. 
Overall, our findings suggest that a larger number of smart informed traders are 
necessary to drive price toward the informed price in markets with UPBIAS and 
DOWNBIAS forecasts as compared to markets with NOBIAS forecasts.  A drawback of 
the preceding analysis, however, is that smart traders’ ability to influence market 
outcomes is potentially affected by their tax rate on dividends (zero or 40 percent).  
Traders who have a zero tax rate usually buy certificates, whereas those who have a 40 
percent tax rate usually sell.  In our markets, traders have a sufficient cash endowment 
such that they can buy as many certificates as others are willing to sell.  By comparison, 
traders can only sell four certificates: their initial endowment of certificates plus two 
short sales.  Consequently, smart informed traders likely have a greater impact on market 
outcomes if their tax rate is zero.
17 
We investigate the link between the number of smart informed traders with a zero 
tax rate and the NAPD.  We refer to these as smart informed buyers.  We also examine 
the percentage of transactions per period that involves at least one smart informed buyer.  
Our findings are shown in Table 6.   
[insert Table 6 here] 
In the NOBIAS markets, the NAPD is below ten percent with two or three smart 
informed buyers.  The increase in the NAPD with four smart informed buyers is 
attributable to one extreme observation: as mentioned earlier, the NAPD is 0.322 in the 
first period of market 2.  Excluding this observation, the average NAPD is 0.026.  In the 
UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS markets, the NAPD decreases as the number of smart 
informed buyers increases.  Three smart informed buyers are necessary to push the   22 
NAPD below ten percent.  Finally, we note that, across all markets, the percentage of 
transactions that involves at least one smart informed buyer increases as the number of 
smart informed buyers increases.  Further, with at least two smart informed buyers, a 
majority of the transactions involves at least one of them.  
 
Forecast acquisition decisions 
  In markets with one forecast, traders readily acquire the forecast, regardless of the 
forecast-generating process.  The average number acquiring the forecast per period is 
5.47, 4.94, and 5.56 in the NOBIAS, UPBIAS, and DOWNBIAS markets, respectively.  
A repeated measures ANOVA indicates that the number does not vary across markets 
sets (F = 0.83, p = 0.480) or over time (F = 1.41, p = 0.265).
18  This finding is consistent 
with that reported elsewhere (Ackert et al., 2002).  The finding is also consistent with 
Jackson’s (1991) theoretical analysis, which suggests that information is acquired over 
time, even though it is eventually revealed in asset price.   
  In markets with two forecasts, we investigate the frequency with which traders 
acquire the unbiased forecast, the biased forecast, and both forecasts.  If traders are able 
to adjust for systematic bias, they may acquire the biased forecast more frequently than 
the unbiased forecast.  The biased forecast contains less variability and, thus, may 
provide a more precise estimate of asset value. 
[insert Table 7 here] 
The average number of times that traders acquire each forecast is shown in Table 
6.  The data are partitioned by market set and presented for periods 1-6, 7-12, and 1-12.  
Traders do not appear to have a preference for the biased over the unbiased forecast.  We 
also observe that a small subset of traders acquire both forecasts, particularly in the   23 
NOUP markets.  This finding, as suggested earlier, potentially impacts the speed of price 
formation. 
For each market set, we perform a repeated measures ANOVA to formally test 
whether traders have a preference for a particular forecast.  The dependent measure is the 
number of times that a forecast is acquired.  The independent variables include the 
forecast (unbiased, biased, or both), time (periods 1-12), and the interaction term.
19   
For the NOUP markets, only forecast is significant at conventional levels (F = 
3.52, p = 0.098).  Pairwise comparisons indicate that traders acquire the unbiased forecast 
more frequently than the biased forecast (p < 0.05).  For the NODOWN markets, again 
forecast is the only statistically significant independent variable (F = 25.07, p = 0.001).  
In this case, pairwise comparisons indicate that traders acquire unbiased and biased 
forecasts more frequently than both forecasts (p < 0.01).  In markets with two forecasts, 
traders may not exhibit a preference for the biased forecast, even though it contains less 
variability, because many have difficulty adjusting sufficiently for the systematic bias.  
From our earlier analysis (refer to Table 4), 20 of 45 have difficulty adjusting for 
optimistic bias and 14 of 46 have difficulty adjusting for pessimistic bias. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  This study reports the results of 15 experimental asset markets designed to 
investigate the effects of alternative forecast-generating processes on market prices, 
traders’ abilities to assess asset value, and the link between the two.  We manipulate the 
forecast-generating process between markets.  In some markets the process produces an 
unbiased, but more variable estimate of asset value, and in others a biased, but less   24 
variable estimate.  The bias is always systematic, though in some markets it is optimistic 
and in others pessimistic.  In all markets, traders decide whether to acquire the forecast. 
We find that, in general, period-end asset price reflects private information, 
regardless of the forecast-generating process.  Within a trading period, asset price appears 
to move toward the informed price, as suggested by a noisy rational expectations 
framework.  The price formation process, however, is not smooth.  Looking at each 
transaction, we find that price sometimes moves toward the informed price and at other 
times away from it.  But over the course of a trading period, the general trend is to move 
toward the informed price.  Informed traders likely bid strategically in an effort to 
conceal their informational advantage.  The bidding strategies, in turn, may affect 
uninformed traders’ inferences of asset value.  If the inferences are incorrect, asset price 
may temporarily wander away from the informed price, as suggested by Bossaerts (2001) 
and Bossaerts & Hillion (2001).  The theoretical work of Rustichini et al. (1994) suggests 
that strategic bidding occurs, but they do not attempt to model the price formation 
process.  Future theoretical research may investigate the price formation process, 
explicitly recognizing that price adjustment may occasionally move away from the 
informed price due to incorrect inferences. 
We also document heterogeneity among traders in their abilities to use the 
forecast to make unbiased predictions of asset value (i.e., whether they are smart traders).  
We find that most traders are able to properly use the unbiased forecast.  By comparison, 
a significant proportion is unable to properly use biased forecasts, with adjustments for 
bias typically being insufficient.  Traders’ adjustments for bias, though sometimes 
insufficient, do not appear to be affected by the direction of the bias.   25 
Linking market outcomes and traders’ abilities, we find that asset price appears to 
properly reflect unbiased forecasts as long as the market includes at least two smart 
informed traders who have sufficient ability to influence market outcomes.  This result is 
consistent with the theory of perfect competition.  We find that the result changes slightly 
when the forecast contains bias.  With optimistic or pessimistic biased forecasts, at least 
three smart informed traders who have sufficient ability to influence market outcomes are 
necessary to produce a comparable result.  This finding is consistent with Foster & 
Viswanathan’s (1996) numerical results.   
An important aspect of our findings is that the make-up of the market can 
dramatically affect asset price.  Theoreticians need to consider this crucial feature in the 
development of models to explain price behavior.  Incorporating heterogeneity, in terms 
of traders’ cognitive processing abilities, and looking at the comparative statics of 
different trader compositions (i.e., the make-up of smart versus other traders) are 
fundamental to understanding price formation.  We encourage theoretical research along 
these lines. 
Lastly, our data indicate that traders do not have a preference for the biased 
forecast over the unbiased forecast, even though the former potentially provides a more 
precise estimate of asset value.  The result likely arises because a significant proportion 
of traders have difficulty fully adjusting for systematic bias.   An important question for 
future research is why traders are unable to completely adjust for optimistic or 
pessimistic bias.  In our markets, some of the difficulty may arise from traders’ inability 
to separate systematic and random error components.  Future research may examine the 
relative magnitude of systematic to nonsystematic error components to determine when   26 
difficulties arise.  It is unclear how much nonsystematic error is necessary to prevent 
traders from fully adjusting for systematic error. 
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Endnotes
 
1 The instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
 
2 The dividend draw is rounded to the nearest dollar and all trading is in dollars. 
3 The use of a pre-selected sequence enhances comparability of markets conducted under 
similar as well as different experimental conditions.  The pre-selected sequence also may 
be used in future research as a means to compare data from an earlier study (Cason & 
Friedman, 1996, note 4). 
4 Operationally, we numbered traders 1-8 and randomly selected four traders, who were 
assigned a zero tax rate for period 1, with the remainder assigned a tax rate of 40 percent.  
We followed the same procedure for periods 2-12; however, once a trader had been 
assigned a zero (40 percent) tax rate six times, the trader was removed from any further 
draws and assigned a 40 percent (zero) tax rate for the remaining periods.  In markets 
with seven traders, each period three or four were assigned each tax rate.  One trader 
number (always trader 8) was omitted across the 12 periods in these markets. 
5 The mean zero, random error term used to determine the forecast value is established 
prior to conducting the markets.  For the unbiased forecasts, we randomly drew and used 
the same values across trading periods 1-12 in the NOBIAS, NOUP, and NODOWN 
markets.  For the biased forecast, we randomly drew and used the values across trading 
periods 1-12 in the UPBIAS, DOWNBIAS, NOUP, and NODOWN markets. 
 
6 We administered this phase of the experiment after the 12 trading periods were 
completed so as not to influence participants’ forecast acquisition decisions. 
 
7 Foster & Viswanathan (1996) examine the case in which informed traders possess 
diverse, but perfectly correlated estimates of asset value.  A special case is when 
informed traders possess identical information, as in our markets with one forecast. 
 
8 The informed price also may be computed assuming that traders only possess the biased 
forecast (as it is computed in the UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS markets).  Theoretically, this 
computation is appropriate if traders only acquire the biased forecast, even though 
unbiased and biased forecasts are available.  As discussed subsequently, traders may 
prefer the biased forecast because it provides a more precise estimate of asset value, 
assuming that traders adjust for the systematic bias.  Although not reported, both 
informed prices are used in the data analysis reported in the next section and inferences 
are unaffected. 
 
9 Experimental research indicates that traders’ predictions of asset price, on average, are 
biased with prediction errors being correlated with observable variables (e.g., Peterson, 
1993; Ackert & Church, 2001). 
 
10 Based on the parameter values used in the experimental markets, the absolute forecast 
error using the unbiased forecast is three times larger than that using the adjusted, biased 
forecast (i.e., assuming participants adjust for the systematic bias component).  The 
absolute difference between the period-end dividend and the unbiased forecast ranges   28 
 
from $8 to $150 with a mean of $81.33.   The absolute difference using the adjusted, 
biased forecast (i.e., adjusted for the systematic bias component) ranges from $3 to $65 
with a mean of $25.83.  If participants fail to acquire the forecast and maintain an 
uninformed prior (i.e., the mean of the asset value distribution of $1,200), the absolute 
forecast error ranges from $65 to $854 with a mean of $285.83. 
 
11 As reported subsequently, neither the number of traders acquiring the forecast per 
period nor the proportion of informed traders per period differs across market sets or over 
periods. 
 
12 Specifically, F = 0.09, p = 0.792 for the NOBIAS markets, F = 0.04, p = 0.868 for the 
UPBIAS markets, F = 2.28, p = 0.270 for the DOWNBIAS markets, F = 0.39, p = 0.596 
for the NOUP markets, and F = 2.56, p = 0.251 for the NODOWN markets.   
 
13 A repeated measures ANOVA indicates that the total number of transactions per period 
does not differ across market sets or over periods.  
 
14 A repeated measures ANOVA indicates that the increase in the NAPD does not differ 
across market sets.  Further, the increase is zero in 75 of 180 periods and less than 5 
percent in 145 of 180 periods. 
 
15 Inferences are unaffected using the proportion of transactions per period to achieve the 
minimum NAPD as the dependent measure.  We also performed a repeated measures 
ANOVA in which we collapsed the data based on the number of forecasts available (one 
versus two).  We find that the number of transactions to reach the minimum NAPD is 
smaller when two forecasts are available as opposed to one (F = 6.38, p = 0.025): the 
means are 3.53 and 4.86, respectively. 
 
16 We also classify traders using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs test.  We determine whether 
traders’ predictions are significantly different from asset value realizations.  If we are 
able to reject the null hypothesis of no difference at the 10 percent significance level, the 
trader is classified as a biased trader.  Otherwise, the trader is classified as a smart trader.  
Although not reported, inferences are unaffected using the alternative classification 
criterion. 
 
17 In Rustichini et al. (1994), buyers and sellers can each transact one certificate.  Hence, 
individual traders do not have the ability to dramatically influence market outcomes. 
. 
18 We repeat the analysis using the proportion of traders acquiring the forecast per period 
as the dependent measure and inferences are unaffected. 
 
19 Inferences are unaffected using the proportion of traders acquiring each forecast per 
period as the dependent measure. 
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Figure 1 – The figure depicts the closing price per period in the NOBIAS markets 
(markets 1-3) as well as the informed price, which reflects the Bayesian updated price 


































































Figure 2 – The figure depicts the closing price per period in the UPBIAS markets 
(markets 4-6) as well as the informed price, which reflects the Bayesian updated price 


































































Figure 3 – The figure depicts the closing price per period in the DOWNBIAS markets 
(markets 7-9) as well as the informed price, which reflects the Bayesian updated price 






































































Figure 4 – The figure depicts the closing price per period in the NOUP markets (markets 
10-12) as well as the informed price, which reflects the Bayesian updated price 






































































Figure 5 – The figure depicts the closing price per period in the NODOWN markets 
(markets 13-15) as well as the informed price, which reflects the Bayesian updated price 
conditioned on the DOWNBIAS forecast.   37 
TABLE 1 
Experimental design 
Market  Referent  Forecast 
Available 
Forecast Value
a  Std Dev  
of Error 
1-3  NOBIAS  Unbiased  Dividend + Error  100 
4-6  UPBIAS  Upward Bias  Dividend + 200 + Error  50 
7-9  DOWNBIAS  Downward Bias  Dividend - 200 + Error  50 
Unbiased  Dividend + Error  100  10-12  NOUP 
Upward Bias  Dividend + 200 + Error  50 
Unbiased  Dividend + Error  100  13-15  NODOWN 
Downward Bias  Dividend - 200 + Error  50 
 
aThe dividend is determined by drawing from a normal distribution with a mean of $1,200 and a standard 
deviation of $400.  The forecast error term is determined by drawing from a normal distribution with a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of $100 for the unbiased forecast and $50 for the biased forecasts. 
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TABLE 2 




a  NOUP and 
NODOWN
a  Period 
Forecast  Inf. 
Price
b 
Forecast  Inf. 
Price
c 










1  1291  1286  1417  1217  1017  1217  1231  1265 
2  1469  1453  1683  1479  1283  1479  1477  1461 
3  928  944  1200  1003  800  1003  988  983 
4  2148  2092  2237  2024  1837  2024  2049  2054 
5  1124  1128  1456  1255  1056  1255  1229  1273 
6  803  826  1149  953  749  953  923  953 
7  922  938  1212  1015  812  1015  997  1020 
8  1654  1627  1726  1521  1326  1521  1547  1529 
9  1397  1385  1435  1234  1035  1234  1267  1300 
10  1343  1335  1505  1303  1105  1303  1311  1276 
11  1583  1560  1684  1480  1284  1480  1500  1531 
12  558  596  670  596  270  481  496  503 
 
aThe NOBIAS forecast is an unbiased estimate of asset value.  The UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS forecasts 
contain a constant bias of "200.  For the UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS forecasts, the informed price is 
computed assuming that participants adjust for the bias.  For the NOUP and NODOWN markets, the 
unbiased and biased forecasts are both available.  The forecasts are the same as those made available in the 
NOBIAS, UPBIAS, and DOWNBIAS markets and, as such, are not repeated in the table.  For the NOUP 
and NODOWN markets, the informed price is computed using both forecasts and assuming that 
participants adjust for the bias. 
bIn markets with the NOBIAS forecast, the informed price is a Bayesian updated price conditioned on the 




2), where FA is the standard deviation of the asset 
value, Fu is the unbiased forecast, FFu is the standard deviation of the unbiased forecast, and µA is the mean 
asset value. 
cIn markets with UPBIAS and DOWNBIAS forecasts, the informed price is a Bayesian updated price 






adj is the biased 
forecast adjusted for the systematic bias, FFb is the standard deviation of the biased forecast, and the other 
terms are as defined in note c. 
dIn markets with two forecasts (NOUP and NODOWN markets), the informed price is a Bayesian updated 














2), where the terms are as defined in notes b and c. 
eThe realized asset value is the period-end dividend, which does not vary across markets.   39 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive data on the price formation process 
 
Panel A: Nearness of the closing price per period to the informed price 
Periods
a  Market Condition 
1-6  7-12  1-12 
NOBIAS  0.092  0.034  0.063 
UPBIAS  0.137  0.134  0.135 
DOWNBIAS  0.105  0.099  0.102 
NOUP  0.093  0.093  0.093 
NODOWN  0.099  0.059  0.079 
 
Panel B: Nearness of the opening price per period to the informed price 
Periods
b  Market Condition 
1-6  7-12  1-12 
NOBIAS  0.216  0.047  0.131 
UPBIAS  0.173  0.206  0.189 
DOWNBIAS  0.204  0.119  0.161 
NOUP  0.160  0.128  0.144 
NODOWN  0.112  0.116  0.114 
 
Panel C: Proportion of transactions per period near the informed price 
Proportion of transactions per period within
c  Market Condition 
5 percent  10 percent  15 percent  20 percent 
NOBIAS  0.560  0.725  0.840  0.862 
UPBIAS  0.351  0.498  0.631  0.749 
DOWNBIAS  0.376  0.515  0.664  0.760 
NOUP  0.338  0.556  0.695  0.849 
NODOWN  0.302  0.667  0.795  0.866 
 
Panel D: Number of transactions per period to reach the minimum NAPD 
Periods
e  Market Condition 
1-6  7-12  1-12 
NOBIAS  4.56  4.11  4.33 
UPBIAS  4.44  5.06  4.75 
DOWNBIAS  5.61  5.39  5.50 
NOUP  4.61  3.33  3.97 
NODOWN  2.89  3.28  3.08 
 
aThe cell entries indicate the mean absolute difference between the closing price per period and the 
informed price, normalized by the informed price (NAPD).   
bThe cell entries indicate the mean absolute difference between the opening price per period and the 
informed price, normalized by the informed price (NAPD). 
cThe cell entries indicate the mean proportion of transactions per period that result in an NAPD (based on 
the transaction price) equal to or less than 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent.  Although not reported, the means are 
similar using the proportion of transactions per period within $50, $100, $150, and $200 of the informed 
price. 
dThe cell entries indicate the mean number of transactions per period that occur to reach the minimum 
NAPD for a period.  Although not reported, inferences are unaffected if the measure is normalized by the 
total number of transctions that occur in a period. 
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TABLE 4 
Traders’ predictive abilities 
 
Panel A: Classification of traders’ predictive abilities using unbiased forecasts
a 
Traders’ Predictions Are  Market 




NOBIAS  20  3  1 
NOUP  19  2  1 
NODOWN  17  6  0 
Total  56  11  2 
c
2 = 3.55, p = 0.470 
 
Panel B: Classification of traders’ predictive abilities using optimistic bias forecasts
a 
Traders Predictions Are  Market 




UPBIAS  12  1  10 
NOUP  13  0  9 
Total  25  1  19 
c
2 = 1.07, p = 0.585 
 
Panel C: Classification of traders’ predictive abilities using pessimistic bias forecasts
a 
Traders Predictions Are  Market 




DOWNBIAS  16  7  0 
NODOWN  16  7  0 
Total  32  14  0 
c
2 = 0.00, p = 1.00 
 
aTraders are classified as being able to make unbiased or biased predictions of asset value based on their 
performance in the prediction periods.  For each trader, we determine whether the sign of the trader’s 
prediction errors is consistently positive or negative.  If five of six signs are the same, the trader is 
classified as biased: upward if the sign is consistently positive and downward if it is consistently negative.  
If the sign of the prediction errors is not consistently positive or negative, the trader is classified as 
unbiased.  For markets with one forecast (NOBIAS, UPBIAS, and DOWNBIAS), each trader is classified 
as making unbiased or biased predictions of asset value conditioned on the trader’s use of a unbiased or 
biased forecast.   For markets with two forecasts (NOUP and NODOWN), each trader is classified twice: 
once based on the trader’s use of the unbiased forecast and again based on the biased forecasts.   
bThe c
2-statistic tests whether the mix of traders making unbiased and biased predictions of asset value 
differs across the relevant market sets, with the p-values being two-tailed.   41 
TABLE 5 
Association between the number of smart informed traders and the NAPD per period 
 




a  Observations  Average 
NAPD
b 
Percent of Smart 
Informed Trades
c 
0  0  -  - 
1  1  0.378  0.667 
2  0  -  - 
3  3  0.059  0.833 
4  8  0.058  0.812 
5  16  0.048  0.989 
6  6  0.022  0.985 
7  2  0.194  1.000 
 




a  Observations  Average 
NAPD
b 
Percent of Smart 
Informed Trades
c 
0  2  0.252  0.000 
1  11  0.196  0.295 
2  10  0.157  0.541 
3  1  0.171  1.000 
4  0  -  - 
5  2  0.093  0.967 
6  8  0.032  0.990 
7  2  0.015  1.000 
 





Observations  Average 
NAPD
b 
Percent of Smart 
Informed Trades
c 
0  0  -  - 
1  0  -  - 
2  2  0.317  0.438 
3  4  0.180  0.900 
4  10  0.113  0.811 
5  11  0.066  0.910 
6  9  0.050  1.000 
7  0  -  - 
 
aSmart informed traders represents the number of informed traders who are classified as making unbiased 
predictions of asset value.   
bThe NAPD is the absolute difference between the closing price per period and the informed price, 
normalized by the informed price.  
cThe percent of smart informed trades represent the percentage of transactions per period that involve at 
least one smart informed trader.   42 
TABLE 6 
Association between the number of smart informed buyers and the NAPD per period 
 




a  Observations  Average 
NAPD
b 




0  0  -  - 
1  4  0.111  0.316 
2  17  0.059  0.506 
3  11  0.039  0.686 
4  4  0.100  0.900 
 





Observations  Average 
NAPD
b 




0  0  -  - 
1  6  0.195  0.476 
2  10  0.100  0.649 
3  15  0.075  0.755 
4  5  0.073  0.883 
 




a  Observations  Average 
NAPD
b 




0  9  0.147  - 
1  9  0.234  0.331 
2  8  0.148  0.661 
3  8  0.026  0.779 
4  2  0.025  0.944 
 
aSmart informed buyers represent the number of informed traders who are classified as making unbiased 
predictions of asset value and have a zero tax rate on dividends.   
bThe NAPD is the absolute difference between the closing price per period and the informed price, 
normalized by the informed price.  
cThe percent of smart informed buyer trades represents the percentage of transactions per period that 
involve at least one smart informed trader who has a zero tax rate on dividends.   43 
TABLE 7 
Forecast acquisition decisions per period when two forecasts are available 
Periods




1-6  7-12  1-12 
Unbiased  2.83  3.33  3.08 
Biased  1.17  1.39  1.28  NOUP 
Both  2.06  1.56  1.81 
Unbiased  2.89  2.83  2.86 
Biased  2.78  3.11  2.94  NODOWN 
Both  0.39  0.39  0.39 
 
aEach period, traders could acquire an unbiased more variable forecast, a biased less variable forecast, or 
both forecasts. 
bThe cell entries indicate the average number of times that traders acquired unbiased, biased, and both 
forecasts per period. 
 
.    
 
 